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We present a pricing kernel that summarizes well the main features of the dynamics of interest rates
and risk in postwar U.S. data and use it to uncover how the pricing kernel has moved with the short
rate in this data. Our findings imply that standard monetary models miss an essential link between
the central bank instrument and the economic activity that monetary policy is intended to affect and
thus we call for a new approach to monetary policy analysis. We sketch a new approach using an economic
model based on our pricing kernel. The model incorporates the key relationships between policy and
risk movements in an unconventional way: the central bank's policy changes are viewed as primarily
intended to compensate for exogenous business cycle fluctuations in risk which threaten to push inflation
off target. This model, while an improvement on standard models, is considered just a starting point
for their revision. It leads to critical questions that researchers need to answer as they continue to revise
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pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.usModern models of monetary policy start from the assumption that the central bank
controls an asset price, namely the short rate, as its policy instrument. In these models this
policy instrument is then linked to the economy through agents’ Euler equation for nominal
bonds. More abstractly, the Euler equation links the policy instrument to the economy
through the model’s pricing kernel. To be useful, a model of how monetary policy aﬀects the
economy should account for how the pricing kernel has moved with the short rate in postwar
U.S. data1.
In this paper we use data on the dynamics of interest rates and risk to uncover how
the pricing kernel has moved with the short rate in postwar U.S. data. Our two main ﬁndings
are that
• Most (over 90%) of the movements in the short rate correspond to random walk move-
ments in the conditional mean of the pricing kernel. We refer to these movements as
the secular movements in the short rate.
• The remaining movements in the short rate, which we refer to as the business cycle
movements in the short rate correspond to movements in the conditional variance of
the pricing kernel associated with changes in risk.
Standard models used for monetary policy analysis are inconsistent, by construction,
with these regularities and, hence, do not capture how the pricing kernel moves with the short
rate. We argue that this inconsistency is a serious problem if we want to use these models
to understand monetary policy and the macroeconomy. We argue that a new approach to
analyzing monetary policy is needed.
Here we sketch a new approach to analyzing monetary policy. To do so we build an
economic model consistent with the comovements of interest rates and risk found in U.S.
data. Using this model we interpret postwar monetary policy as follows.
• Secular movements of the short rate arise as a result of random walk movements in the
Fed’s inﬂation target.
1Throughout this paper we consider models in which all variables are conditionally log-normal and we use
the term pricing kernel as short-hand for the log of the pricing kernel.• Business cycle movements of the short rate arise as a result of the Fed’s endogenous
policy response to exogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations in risk. The Fed chooses this
policy response to maintain inﬂation close to its target.
In our economic model, what the Fed is doing over the business cycle is simply respond-
ing to exogenous changes in the real risk. Speciﬁcally the Fed is responding to exogenous
changes in the conditional variance of the real pricing kernel with the aim of maintaining in-
ﬂation close to a target level. Clearly, this view diﬀers substantially from the standard view
of what the Fed does over the business cycle. In the standard view, risk plays no role. Instead
the Fed’s policy is a function of its forecasts of economic variables that enter the mean of
the pricing kernel, such as expected real growth and expected inﬂation. This policy is often
summarized by a Taylor rule. Our interpretation of the historical record is that over the
business cycle what the Fed actually did has little to do with these forecasts about changes
in conditional means of growth and inﬂation. Instead, policy mainly responded to exogenous
changes in real risk.
While we ﬁnd our model helpful in interpreting the data, it represents, at best, a start
to a new approach. Going beyond this speciﬁc model, our empirical ﬁndings lead us to raise
two broader questions to be answered in future research in monetary policy analysis.
The ﬁrst question regards the secular movements in the Fed’s policy instrument: Why
did the Fed choose such large secular movements in its policy instrument, namely the short
rate? In our economic model we mechanically describe the secular movements in Fed policy
as arising from a random walk inﬂation target. Our approach here is similar to that followed
in many recent monetary models. The main problem we see with this approach is that
it attributes the vast bulk of the movements in the Fed’s policy instrument to a purely
mechanical factor. Thus while this approach may be adequate as a statistical description of
Fed policy, it seems useless for answering fundamental questions at any more than a superﬁcial
level: Why did the great inﬂation of the 1970s occur? Why did it end? Is it likely to occur
again? and How can we change institutions to reduce that likelihood?
We argue that to answer such questions, a deeper model of the forces driving the secular
component of policy is needed. We brieﬂy discuss some ambitious attempts by Orphanides
(2002), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2005), and Primiceri (2006) at modeling these forces but
2ﬁnd them wanting. We are led to call for a new approach to modeling the economic forces
underlying the secular movements in Fed policy.
The second question regards the business cycle comovements between the Fed’s policy
instrument and the macroeconomy as captured in the Euler equation: How do we ﬁxo u r
models so that they capture this link? The Euler equation in standard monetary models links
the short rate to expectations of growth in the log of the marginal utility of consumption and
inﬂation. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) document that this Euler equation in these
models does a poor job of capturing this link between policy and the economy at business
cycle frequencies.
We oﬀer a potential explanation for the failure of the Euler equation. Existing research
nearly universally imposes that the conditional variances of these variables that enter the
Euler equation are constant. Thus, all the movements in the pricing kernel in these models
arise from movements in conditional means. With our model of the pricing kernel we ﬁnd
precisely the opposite, at least for the business cycle. That is, over the business cycle nearly
all of the movements in the Euler equation come from movements in conditional variances
and not from conditional means.
Given this ﬁnding we argue that recent attempts to ﬁx this Euler equation by making
the conditional means of the pricing kernel more volatile while continuing to assume that the
conditional variances are constant are misguided. We argue that instead researchers should
be looking for a framework that delivers smooth conditional means and volatile conditional
variances of the pricing kernel at business cycle frequencies. That is, researchers should come
to terms with the fact that at business cycle frequencies interest rates move one for one with
risk.
In terms of antecedents for this work, our pricing kernel builds on the work of Backus,
Foresi, Mozumdar, and Wu (2001) and Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001). Our economic
model is a pure exchange economy with exogenous time-varying real risk. Since the early con-
tribution by McCallum (1994) a large literature has studied interest rates in such economies.
Examples include Wachter (2006), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007), Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld,
Palomino, and Zin (2007), Piazzesi and Schneider (2007). Our model draws most heavily
from the work of Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Zin (2005).
3Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 documents four key regularities regarding the
dynamics of interest rates and risk that we use to guide our construction of the pricing kernel.
Section 2 documents that standard monetary models are inconsistent with these regularities
and lays out our pricing kernel. Section 3 presents our two main ﬁndings regarding the
comovements of the short rate and the pricing kernel in postwar U.S. data. Section 4 presents
t h ee c o n o m i cm o d e lw eu s et h ei n t e r p r e tt h e s eﬁndings. Section 5 discusses the two broader
questions for monetary policy research that follow from our ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
1. The Behavior of Interest Rates and Risk: Evidence
E m p i r i c a lw o r ki nﬁnance over the last several decades has established some regularities
regarding the dynamics of interest rates and risk that any useful analysis of monetary policy
must address.
In this paper we focus on the implications of four of these regularities for the analysis of
monetary policy. We will argue that standard monetary models are not consistent with these
regularities and that a new approach is needed if we are to build models for monetary policy
analysis that are consistent with these regularities. We document these four regularities here.
Two of the regularities regard the dynamics of interest rates and two regard the co-
movements of interest rates and risk.
A. Dynamics of Interest Rates
To document the ﬁrst two regularities we use a traditional principal components analy-
sis to summarize the dynamics of the yield curve. This analysis reveals the following two
regularities.
1. The ﬁrst principal component accounts for a large majority of the movements in the
yield curve. Because it is associated with similar movements in the yields on all ma-
turities (essentially parallel shifts in the term structure), this component is commonly
referred to as the level factor in interest rates. It also has the property that it is (nearly)
permanent and is well modeled by a random walk. We here will refer to the ﬁrst prin-
cipal component as the secular component of interest rates in order to emphasize that
permanence. In the data this secular component corresponds closely to the long rate.
42. The second principal components accounts for most of the remaining movements in the
yield curve. Because it is associated with changes in the diﬀerence between the short
rate and the long rate–with changes in the slope of the yield curve–it is commonly
referred to as the slope factor in interest rates. This component also captures most
of the movements in interest rates at business cycle frequencies. We will here refer to
this component as the business cycle component of interest rates in order to emphasize
that property. In the data, this business cycle component is essentially the yield spread
between the long rate and the short rate.
We document these two regularities here. We use monthly data on the rates of U.S.
Treasury bills of maturities of three months and imputed zero coupon yields for maturities
of from one to thirteen years over the postwar period from 1946:12 to 2007:12. For 1946:12—
1991:2, we use data from McCulloch and Kwon (1993) for these series; for 1991:3—2007:12 we
use CRISP data for the three-month T-bill rate and data from Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright
(2006) for the other zero coupon rates. (In the rest of our analysis, we use the three-month
T-bill rate as our measure of the short rate and the thirteen-year zero coupon rate as our
measure of the long rate.)
Our principal components analysis of the yield curve uses the traditional procedure
(closely following that of Piazzesi forthcoming, Section 7.2.) We focus on the ﬁrst two prin-
cipal components, which together account for over 99% of the variance of the short rate and
over 99.8% of the total variance of all yields. In Figure 1 we plot the short rate and the ﬁrst
two principal components of the yield curve which result from our analysis.2
To document our ﬁrst regularity, we note that the ﬁrst principal component accounts
for over 90% of the variance of the short rate. (It also accounts for over 97% of the total
variance of all yields). This component has a monthly autocorrellation over .993. Figure 1
demonstrates visually that this component captures the long secular swings in the short rate.
Figure 2 demonstrates that it also corresponds closely to the long rate.
To document our second regularity, we show in Figure 3 that the second principal
component is very similar to the yield spread between the short and long rate. This component
2We have scaled these principal components so that the short rate’s loadings on each of these components
are equal to one.
5has a monthly correlation of .957. Figure 1 demonstrates that, barring one exception in the
early 1980s, this component captures well the business cycle movements in the short rates.
B. Interest Rates and Risk
With regard to the dynamics of interest rates and risk, decades of empirical work has
revealed that movements in the business cycle component of interest rates are associated with
substantial movements in risk. Speciﬁcally, this work has found two regularities regarding
the comovements of interest rates and expected excess returns.
3. Movements in the diﬀerence between the short rate and the long rate–that is, the yield
spread–are associated with movements risks, deﬁned as in the expected excess returns
to holding long term bonds of a similar magnitude.
4. Movements in the short rate relative to foreign-currency short rates are associated with
movements in risk, deﬁned as the expected excess returns to holding foreign-currency
bonds of a similar magnitude.
We follow much of the literature in interpreting movements in expected excess returns
as movements in the compensation for risk.3
Before we cite some of the work documenting these regularities, let’s describe them
more precisely.
We begin with the regularity on the yield spread and the expected excess returns to
holding long bonds. We use the following notation to describe these empirical results. Let
Pk
t denote the price in time period t of a zero-coupon bond that pays oﬀ one dollar in period
t + k and let pk
t =l o gPk
t . Then the (log) holding period return, that is the return to holding




t.T h e ( l o g ) excess return to holding
this bond over the short rate it is rk
xt+1 = rk
t+1 − it.T h erisk premium on long bonds is the
expected excess return Etrk
xt+1. Many researchers have run return forecasting regressions of










3The bulk of the asset pricing literature interprets measured returns as capturing the total payoﬀst o
owning an asset and accounts for diﬀerences in returns as arising from diﬀerences in risk. In doing so
this literature assumes that measured returns do not leave out some portion of total returns, such as taxes
transactions costs or liquidity services that both diﬀer across assets and vary over the business cycle.
6where yk
t ≡− pk
t/k is the yield to maturity on this bond. Regressions this form have been
run for 20 years, starting with the work of Fama and Bliss (1987). (See also the work of
Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).)
Note that under the hypothesis that the risk premia on long bonds are constant over
time, the slope coeﬃcient β
k of this regression should be zero. In the data, however, these
regressions yield estimates of β
k that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with point estimates
typically greater than one for moderate to large k.
We emphasize the magnitude of this slope coeﬃcient here because these regression
results thus imply that the risk premium on long bonds moves more than one for one with
the yield spread. More precisely, note that a ﬁnding that the slope coeﬃcient β






t − it) ≥ var(y
k
t − it) (2)
which, by the use of simple algebra, implies that the variance in the risk premium on long





t − it). (3)
The fourth regularity regarding movements in the spread between the short rate and
foreign currency denominated short rates and the expected excess returns to holding foreign
currency denominated bonds is simply a consequence of the empirical ﬁnding that exchange
rates are well-approximated by random walks as documented by Meese and Rogoﬀ (19??)
a n dm u c hs u b s e q u e n tw o r k .





t + et+1 − et − it (4)
denote the (log) excess return on a foreign short bond with rate i∗
t where et is the log of the





t − it. (5)
That is, the expected excess return on a foreign bond is simply the interest diﬀerential across
currencies.
72. Towards an Economic Model
In this section we present the result that standard models, by assumption, cannot
match the dynamics of interest and risks that we have discussed and we present a simple
model of the pricing kernel that is consistent with these dynamics.
A. The Standard Euler Equation
Consider ﬁrst the link between the short rate and macroeconomic aggregates built into
standard monetary models.
We begin with representative agent models. The short term nominal interest rate











where it is the logarithm of the short term nominal interest rate 1+it, β and Uct are the
discount factor and the marginal utility of the representative consumer, and πt+1 is the
inﬂation rate. Analysts then commonly assume that the data are well-approximated by a





















A critical question in monetary policy analysis is what terms on the right hand side
of (7) change when the monetary authority changes the interest rate it. The traditional
assumption is that conditional variances are constant, so that the second term on the right
side of (7) is constant. This leaves the familiar version of the Euler equation:
it = −Et log
Uct+1
Uct
+ Et logπt+1 + constant. (8)
Thus, by assumption, standard monetary models imply that movements in the short rate are
associated one-for-one with the sum of movements in the expected growth of the log of the
marginal utility of the representative consumer and expected inﬂation. The debate in the
literature on the eﬀects of monetary policy might thus be summarized roughly as a debate
over how much of the movement in the short rate is reﬂected in the expected growth of the
log of marginal utility of consumption (representing a real eﬀect of monetary policy) and how
much of the movement is reﬂected in expected log inﬂation (representing a nominal eﬀect of
8monetary policy). A resolution of this debate in the context of a speciﬁc model depends on
the speciﬁcation of its other equations. However, virtually universally, the possibility that
movements in the short rate might be associated with changes in the conditional variances
of these variables is ruled out by assumption.
We have described the standard Euler equation in the context of a model with a
representative consumer. Our discussion also applies to more general models which do not
assume a representative consumer. To see this note that we can write equations (6)-(8) more
abstractly in terms of a nominal pricing kernel (or stochastic discount factor) mt+1 as
exp(−it)=Et expmt+1. (9)
In a model with a representative agent this pricing kernel is given by exp(mt+1)=βUct+1/
(Uctπt+1) and (9) is the representative agent’s ﬁrst-order condition for optimal bond holdings.
In some segmented market models (9) is ﬁrst-order condition for the subset of agents who
actually participate in the bond market; in others, (9) is no single agent’s ﬁrst-order condition.
In general, (9) is implied by lack of arbitrage possibilities in the ﬁnancial market.
Using conditional lognormality, we see that (9) implies that




and with constant conditional variances, we have that
it = −Etmt+1 + constant. (11)
Thus the more general assumption made in the literature is that movements in the short term
interest rate are associated with movements in the conditional mean of the log of the pricing
kernel and not with movements in its conditional variance.
Standard monetary models with constant conditional variances are clearly inconsis-
tent with the evidence on the comovements of interest rates and risk. We can see this by
considering the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In any model with a pricing kernel in which variables are conditionally
lognormal and conditional second movements are constant, risk is constant.
9Proof. Let mt+1 be (the log of) the pricing kernel and let rt+1 be any log asset return.
Lack of arbitrage implies the standard asset pricing formula:
1=Et exp(mt+1 + rt+1) (12)
Taking logs of (12) and using conditional lognormality gives that




Using (10) implies that the expected excess return on this asset:
Etrt+1 − it = −
1
2
vart(rt+1) − covt(mt+1,r t+1). (13)
So if conditional second moments are constant, then expected excess returns are constant.
Hence risk is constant. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that when we log-linearize our models and impose that the
primitive shocks have constant conditional variances, risk is constant. Our reading of the
literature on monetary policy is that these assumptions are nearly universal. Yet as we have
seen, the evidence is clear that risk is not constant. This seems a serious problem if we want
to use these models to understand what in the macroeconomy moves when the short rate
moves.
B. A Simple Model of the Pricing Kernel
Here we present a simple model of the pricing kernel that is consistent with the evidence
on interest rates and risk that we have discussed. This model serves as a statistical summary
of the joint dynamics of interest rates and risk. In the next section we use this model to
decompose movements in the short rate observed in postwar U.S. data into movements in
the conditional mean of the pricing kernel and its conditional variance. This model is similar
to the “negative” Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model analyzed by Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar, and
Wu (2001) augmented with a random walk process and an independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) shock to the pricing kernel. To analyze the expected excess returns on
foreign bonds we extend the model to having two countries and two currencies in a manner
similar to that in the work 2001 work of Backus, Foresi, and Telmer.
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The model has two state variables z1t and z2t that govern the dynamics of the pricing
kernel, interest rates, and risk. One state variable follows a random walk with
z1t+1 = z1t + σ1ε1t+1 (14)
and the other follows an AR1 process with heteroskedastic innovations given by
z2t+1 =( 1− ϕ)θ + ϕz2t + z
1/2
2t σ2 2t+1. (15)
The innovations ε1t+1,ε 2t+1, are independent, standard, normal random variables. Because
these state variables are independent and all yields will be linear combinations of these vari-
ables, they correspond to the principal components of the yield curve implied by this pricing
kernel. We will show below that z1t is a level factor and z2t is a slope factor. To emphasize its
p e r s i s t e n c ew er e f e rt oz1t in the model as the secular component of interest rates. Because
it is stationary we refer to z2t in the model as the business cycle component of interest rates.
(We calibrate our model so that the secular and business cycle components in the model
correspond closely to the secular and business cycle components that we have identiﬁed in
the data.)
We use these two state variables to parameterize the dynamics of the pricing kernel.
The (log of the) pricing kernel mt+1 is given by
−mt+1 = δ + z1t + σ1 1t+1 − (1 − λ
2/2)z2t + z
1/2
2t λ 2t+1 + σ3 3t+1 (16)
where  3t+1 is a third independent standard normal random variable.
The Short Rate
Given this stochastic process for the pricing kernel, we use the standard asset pricing
formula
it = −logEt exp(mt+1)
to solve for the dynamics of the short rate. Because the pricing kernel is conditionally
lognormal, we have that
it = −Etmt+1 −
1
2
Va r t(mt+1) (17)
11so that movements in the short rate correspond to a combination of movements in the condi-
tional mean of the log of the pricing kernel and movements in the conditional variance of the
log of the pricing kernel. Observe that the conditional mean of the log of the pricing kernel
is given by
Etmt+1 = −δ − z1t +( 1− λ
2/2)z2t (18)















We thus have that







3)+z1t − z2t (20)
Note that the structure of this model implies that the state variable z1t is the secular compo-
nent of the short rate and the state variable z2t is the business cycle component of the short
rate.
In contrast to standard monetary models, this model allows for variation over time in
the conditional variance of the pricing kernel. As (19) makes clear, that variation corresponds
to business cycle movements in the short rate, with the extent of that variation governed by
the parameter λ. In particular, λ governs how movements in the business cycle component of
the short rate are divided up between movements in the conditional mean of the (log of the)
pricing kernel and the conditional variance of the (log of the) pricing kernel. Speciﬁcally, the
response of the conditional mean of the pricing kernel to z2t is 1 − λ
2/2, and the response of
1/2 the conditional variance is λ
2/2.T h u s ,i fλ =0 , then here, as in the standard model, the
conditional variance of the pricing kernel is constant and all movements in z2t correspond to
movements in the conditional mean of the log of the pricing kernel. In contrast, if λ =
√
2,
then the conditional mean of the pricing kernel does not respond to movements in z2t while
one half the conditional variance of the pricing kernel responds one for one with z2t.I f
λ>
√
2, then the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the pricing kernel move
in opposite directions when the business cycle component of the short rate moves.
12Longer-Term Interest Rates
To solve for longer term interest rates we use the standard asset pricing formula
p
k
t =l o gEt exp(mt+1 + p
k−1
t+1) (21)
to set up a recursive formula for bond prices. These prices are linear functions of the states
z1t and z2t of the form.
p
k
t = −Ak − Bkz1t − Ckz2t, (22)
where Ak, Bk,a n dCk are constants. Then we can use standard undetermined coeﬃcients to
derive this proposition:
Proposition 2. The coeﬃcients of the bond prices are given recursively by









Bk = Bk−1 +1 ,
and
Ck = −(1 − λ





with A1 = δ − (σ2
1 + σ2
3)/2, B1 =1 , C1 = −1.
Proof. To ﬁnd these prices, we start with k =1to ﬁnd the price of the short-term
bond, using the asset pricing formula (21) with p0
t+1 =0 , so that
p
1




so plugging into both sides gives that








For k>1, we write the coeﬃcients at k as functions of the coeﬃcients at k − 1 as
follows. Given our form in (22), we know that
p
k−1
t+1 = −Ak−1 − Bk−1z1t+1 − Ck−1z2t+1
13Using the form of the dynamics of the state variables (14) and (15) we have that
p
k−1
t+1 = −Ak−1 − Bk−1z1t − Bk−1σ1 1t+1 − Ck−1(1 − ϕ)θ − Ck−1ϕz2t − Ck−1σ2z
1/2
2t  2t+1.
Note then that this bond price is conditionally lognormal. Combining this bond price with
our form for mt+1 gives that
















1 − (Bk−1 +1 ) z1t−
[−(1 − λ










t = −Ak − Bkz1t − Ckz2t
then gives recursive formulas for the coeﬃcients of bond prices and yields. Q.E.D.
Level and Slope Factors ≈ Secular and Business Cycle Components
We now show that in our model the secular component of interest rates z1t corresponds
to a level factor which leads to parallel shifts in the yield curve and that the business cycle
component z2t corresponds to a slope factor which leads to changes in the spread between
the long and short rates.
Since yields are related to prices by yk
t = −pk







(Ak + Bkz1t + Ckz2t).
Thus, the implications of this model for the yield curve and its movements depend on the
behavior of the coeﬃcients Ak/k, Bk/k, Ck/k. Note here that our recursion implies that
Bk = k. Thus we can write yields as
y
k




Clearly, movements in the secular component z1t correspond to parallel shifts in the yield
curve because when this component moves all yields shift by the same amount. Hence, this
14component corresponds to a level factor in yields.4 Note that this result follows from the fact
that z1t is a random walk.
We next show that z2t corresponds to a slope factor. To see this, note that Ck converges
to a negative constant ¯ C as k grows. Hence, for large k,m o v e m e n t si nz2t have no impact on
long yields since ¯ C/k goes to zero as k gets large. In particular, since C1 = −1,w eh a v et h a t
any yield diﬀerential is given by
y
k
t − it = constant +( Ck/k +1 )z2t
and the observation that Ck/k converges to zero as k gets large implies that at the same time
the yield diﬀerential converges to
y
k
t − it = constant + z2t.
Thus, z2t is a slope factor in that movements in it correspond to movements in the spread
between the long rate and the short rates for long enough maturity bonds.
Expected Excess Returns
We now turn to our model’s implications for expected excess returns on both long
term bonds and foreign currency denominated bonds.
Long Term Bonds W eb e g i nw i t ht h ee x c e s sr e t u r n st o holding a long term bond for one
period. To computed these in our model we use the asset pricing formula (21). Since bond
prices and the pricing kernel are conditionally lognormal, we can write this formula as
p
k





Va r t(mt+1 + p
k−1
t+1).







t − it =
1
2
Va r t(mt+1) −
1
2
Va r t(mt+1 + p
k−1
t+1),
4Note that theoretically, the inclusion of a random walk component of the short rate leads to counterfactual
implications for the average value of very long yields. This is because Ak is has a component that grows
linearly with k as k gets large and then a component that grows with k2 coming from B2
k−1.T h i s i m p i e s
that for large k, the constant Ak/k goes to negative inﬁnity fast. We will not worry about this limiting
implication. Instead, we imagine that the random walk component of interest rates is in fact stationary, but












Thus, we see that expected excess returns, which we interpret as compensation for risk, are
determined by a combination of movements in the conditional variance of the log of the
pricing kernel, the conditional variance of bond prices, and the covariance between the log of
t h ep r i c i n gk e r n e la n dt h el o go fb o n dp r i c e s .
Using our solutions for bond prices in the formula for excess returns (23) gives this
proposition:
Proposition 3. The expected excess returns on holding a long term bonds are given by
Etr
k
xt+1 = Dk + Fkz2t (24)
















Note from (24) that movements in expected excess returns on long bonds are a function
only of movements in the business cycle component of interest rates z2t. Hence, a regression






We refer to these slope coeﬃcients as the Fama-Bliss coeﬃcients.
Foreign Currency—Denominated Bonds T h ee x p e c t e de x c e s sr e t u r no naf o r e i g nc u r -





t + Etet+1 − et − it
where i∗
t denotes the log of the foreign short rate and et denotes the log of the exchange
rate. To model these expected excess returns we also model the foreign pricing kernel m∗
t+1.
This foreign kernel prices foreign currency denominated assets and thus can be used to derive
16foreign bond prices in a manner similar to what we have done above for domestic bond prices.











The lack of arbitrage in complete ﬁnancial markets implies that
et+1 − et = m
∗
t+1 − mt+1, (27)
so that taking conditional expectations gives



















We model the foreign pricing kernel in a symmetric fashion as the domestic pricing
kernel as in (14), (15), and (16) and impose that the parameters in the two countries are iden-
tical. We also impose that secular component of interest rates is common to both countries,
in that z1t = z∗
1t. Under these assumptions

























t − it) (31)
Note that with λ =
√
2, the expected change in the exchange rate in our model is constant
and hence exchange rates are a random walk. With this choice of λ, the expected excess
return to a foreign currency bond is simply Etr∗
xt+1 = z∗
2t − z2t = i∗
t − it.
C. Calibration and Consistency With the Evidence
We have derived our model’s implications for the key features of the data on the
dynamics of interest rates and risk that motivate our study. We will use this model to
decompose the observed postwar U.S. history of interest rates into a secular and a business
cycle component and to measure the comovements of these components of the short rate with
the conditional mean and the conditional variance of the pricing kernel.
17To do so, however, we must ﬁrst choose parameter values for our model. We set the
time period to be a month. We choose parameter values so that our model is quantitatively
consistent with the four facts that motivate our analysis. Since we demean the data we
need only choose parameters that aﬀect our model’s implications of how interest rates and
risk move as the secular and business cycle components move. Thus we need only set the
parameters that determine Bk and Ck and the expected excess returns on long term bonds
and foreign bonds. These parameters are λ, which determines how the conditional variance
of the pricing kernel moves with the business cycle component of interest rates, and ϕ and
σ2, which govern how persistent the business cycle component is and how the conditional
variance of the business cycle component moves with its level. We set these parameters to
be λ =
√
2,ϕ= .99, and σ2 = .017 so that the model reproduces the four regularities on
interest rates and risk we have discussed above. We now discuss our model’s quantitative
implications for each of these regularities.
1. That the secular component of interest rates z1t in the model is a random walk that
acts like a level factor on the yield curve is built in to the speciﬁcation. This level factor
in our model corresponds closely to the ﬁrst principal component of interest rates we
discussed. We demonstrate this result in Figure 4, where we plot the loadings on the
ﬁrst principal component from the data for bonds of maturities three months and from
one to thirteen years, together with the coeﬃcients Bk/k (the “loadings” on z1t)f o rt h e
same maturities from our model.
2. That the business cycle component of interest rates z2t in the model acts like a slope
factor is also built into the speciﬁcation. With our chosen parameters this slope factor in
our model corresponds closely to the second principal component of interest rates that
we discussed above. We demonstrate this also in Figure 4, where we plot the loadings
on the second principal component from the data for bonds of maturities three months
and from one to thirteen years, together with the coeﬃcients Ck/k (the “loadings” on
z2t) for the same maturities from our model.
3. That movements in the yield spread are associated with movements in the expected
excess returns on long bonds of similar magnitude (risk) follows from our parameter
18choices. Speciﬁcally, at these parameter values, (25) implies that the Fama-Bliss coef-
ﬁcient for a ﬁve-year bond is 1.
4. That movements in the short rate relative to foreign-currency short rates are associated
with movements in the expected excess returns to holding foreign-currency bonds of
a similar magnitude (risk) also follows from our parameter choices. Speciﬁcally, since
λ =
√
2, (30) and (31) implies that exchange rates are a random walk and that ex-
pected excess returns on foreign bonds thus move exactly one-for-one with the interest
diﬀerential.
As we have seen in Figure 4 the coeﬃcients on z1t and z2t in the model correspond
closely to the factor loadings on the ﬁrst and second principal components. Hence, in our
decomposition the constructed interest rates capture the dynamics of yield curve nearly as
well as the ﬁrst two principal components do in the data. Recall that these two components
account for over 99% of the both the variance of the short rate and the overall variance of the
yield curve. In this sense our decomposition captures the dynamics of interest rates extremely
well.
We have purposefully chosen a very parsimonious parameterization of the pricing ker-
nel and have chosen parameters so that the model closely matches the dynamics of interest
rates and risk. Speciﬁcally, we chose parameters so that the responses of yields and excess
returns to the state variables as summarized by the coeﬃcients Bk and Ck match those found
in the data. We have abstracted from the model’s implications for means of yields and excess
returns, as summarized by the coeﬃcients Ak. Our model does not have enough parameters
to simultaneously match all three sets of coeﬃcients. (For some work on pricing kernels with
a larger number of parameters that attempt to match both the dynamics and the means of
interest rates and risk see Dai and Singleton 2003 and Cochrane and Piazzesi 2008.) We have
adapted a simpler approach because we ﬁnd it more useful in deriving lessons for monetary
policy analysis.
In summary, we have a quantitative pricing kernel model that captures very well the
dynamics of interest rates and is consistent with empirical evidence on how risk moves with
interest rates.
193. The Decomposition of Interest Rates
We now use our pricing kernel to decompose the movements in the short rate observed
in postwar U.S. data into movements in the conditional mean and the conditional variance of
the pricing kernel. Our two main ﬁndings are the following. First, movements in the secular
component of the short rate correspond to random walk movements in the conditional mean
of the pricing kernel. Second, movements in the business cycle component of the short rate
correspond to movements in the conditional variance of the pricing kernel.
To construct our decomposition, we set z1t and z2t equal to the observed history of the
ﬁrst and second principal components after scaling these components appropriately.5 With
this deﬁnition of z1t and z2t we obtain the same decomposition of the short rate into secular
and business cycle components shown in Figure 1.
When we do so the secular and business cycle components in our model account for the
same portion of movements in the short rate that is accounted for by the ﬁrst two principal
components of interest rates in the data, over 99%.
We now use our model of the pricing kernel to interpret this decomposition.
A. Expectations of Future Policy
Our model gives a simple interpretation of the decomposition in Figure 1. Movements
in z1t in the ﬁgure represent movements in expectations of where the short rate will be in
the long run. Under this interpretation in the postwar period, over 90% of the variance
in the Fed’s policy instrument–the short rate–is associated with movements in agents’
expectations of where the Fed will be setting its policy instrument in the distant future.
B. The Short Rate and the Pricing Kernel
Consider next what the decomposition implies for the comovements of the short rate
with the conditional mean and variance of the pricing kernel. Recall that




5Movements in the principal components are determined only up to a scale factor. Motivated by (20)
w es e tt h es c a l ef a c t o ro nt h e s ec o m p o n e n t ss ot h a tt h er e s p o n s er a t eo ft h es h o r tr a t et ot h eﬁrst principal
component is 1 and the response of the short rate to the second principal component is −1.
20As we have discussed above standard monetary analyses impose that that the conditional
variances are constant, so that
it = −Etmt+1 + constant. (33)
In our model (18) and (19) imply that when λ =
√
2,





vart(mt+1)=constant − z2t. (35)
This result gives a very stark interpretation of the decomposition of the short rate shown
in Figure 1: movements in the secular component of the short rate are movements in the
conditional mean of the pricing kernel and movements in the business cycle component are
movements in the conditional variance of the pricing kernel.
These results thus imply that, at least for business cycle analysis, existing monetary
models miss the link between the short rate and the economy present in postwar U.S. data.
In these models, movements in the short rate are associated solely with movements in the
conditional mean of the pricing kernel. Our quantitative model implies that for business cycle
analysis, in the data movements in the short rate are associated solely with movements in
the conditional variance of the pricing kernel.
4 .T o w a r d saN e wV i e wo fM o n e t a r yP o l i c y
Our pricing kernel is a statistical summary of the joint dynamics of interest rates and
risk observed in postwar U.S. data. To give an economic interpretation of this pricing kernel
we build an economic model in which equilibrium asset prices are described by this pricing
kernel. In this sense our economic model is consistent with the dynamics of interest rates
and risk observed in postwar U.S. data. We use this economic model to lay a foundation for
a new view of monetary policy.
Using our pricing kernel model, we have made two points about the postwar history of
the Fed’s policy instrument: Most of the movements in this policy instrument are permanent,
21driven by the secular component. And the business cycle movements in this policy instru-
ment are associated with movements in risk. In our economic model we give an interpretation
of these ﬁndings with two assumptions: the secular movements in the Fed’s policy instru-
ment arise from permanent movements in the Fed’s inﬂation target and the business cycle
movements in the Fed’s policy instrument arise from the Fed’s endogenous policy response
to exogenous changes in real risk in the economy. We then discuss how this interpretation
leads to a new view of monetary policy.
The model economy we build here is a pure exchange economy with exogenous time-
varying risk. Since the early contribution by McCallum (1994), a large literature has studied
interest rates in such economies. Examples include the work of Wachter (2006), Bansal and
Shaliastovich (2007), Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, Palomino, and Zin (2007), Piazzesi and Schneider
(2007).
A. An Economic Interpretation of the Model
Here we identity the various key parts of our pricing kernel model with their economic
counterparts.
Again, we interpret the secular component of interest rates in our model as corre-
sponding to the Fed’s long run inﬂation target π∗
t = z1t, which follows a random walk. We
interpret the shock ε3t+1 in the pricing kernel as the deviation of realized inﬂation πt+1 from
the inﬂation target π∗
t+1. Given this interpretation, realized inﬂation in our model is the sum
of a random walk component and an i.i.d. component,
πt+1 = z1t+1 + ε3t+1,
as in the model of inﬂation studied by Stock and Watson (2007).
We interpret the business cycle component of nominal interest rates in our model (z2t)
as corresponding to the real pricing kernel derived from the growth of the marginal utility
of the representative agent in our economy. Assume that the representative consumer has









where Xt is an exogenous stochastic process for external habit.
22Since habit is external, the representative consumer’s marginal utility is given by
(Ct − Xt)
−γ




Using lower case letters for logarithms of variables, we write the pricing kernel as
mt+1 =l o gβ − γ(ct+1 − ct + st+1 − st)
We assume that the logarithm of consumption growth is i.i.d. with
ct+1 − ct = δc + σc 2t+1
Note that in this representative agent framework, ct is also aggregate consumption. We as-
sume that the external habit level Xt is a non-linear function of lagged values of consumption,
habit, and a preference shock z2t given implicitly by
st+1 = st + η(z2t) 2t+1
where z2t evolves according to











and ε2t+1 independent of ε1t+1, the pricing kernel in this economy is given by (14), (15), and
(16) with λ =
√
2.
B. A New View of U.S. Monetary Policy
This economic interpretation of our model leads to a new interpretation of the history
of U.S. monetary policy in the postwar period. Under this new interpretation, the business
cycle movements in the Fed’s policy instrument, the short rate, arise as a result of the Fed’s
need to compensate for exogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations in risk as it aims for its inﬂation
target.
23Speciﬁcally, under this interpretation of our model, expected growth of consumption is
always constant and the Fed is always hitting its inﬂation target, at least in expectation. In a
standard model, with constant risk, the movements in the short rate would then correspond
only to movements in the Fed’s inﬂation target, that is
it = constant + π
∗
t.
In this model, however, risk is time-varying because of exogenous shifts in habit, so that the
short rate has a business cycle component that is driven by these business cycle ﬂuctuations
in risk:





vartmt+1 = constant + π
∗
t − z2t.
These business cycle ﬂuctuations in the Fed’s policy instrument are required to ensure that
inﬂa t i o ns t a y so nt a r g e ta n dc o r r e s p o n di nt h ed a t at oﬂuctuations in the slope of the yield
curve.
A simple way to summarize our view about what the Fed does over the business cycle
is that it simply responds to exogenous changes in real risk–speciﬁcally to exogenous changes
in the conditional variance of the real pricing kernel–with the aim of maintaining inﬂation
close to a target level. This seems to be not what standard monetary policy analysis focuses
on. In our experience as Fed staﬀ members, for example, we know that the typical policy
meeting at the Fed involves of detailed discussions of forecasts of economic variables that
enter the mean of the pricing kernel, such as expected real growth and expected inﬂation.
These discussions are often summarized by a Taylor rule for policy that makes no reference
to risk. Our interpretation of the historical record, however, is that over the business cycle,
the Fed’s response had little to do with these forecasts about changes in conditional means
of growth and inﬂation. Instead, policy mainly responds to exogenous changes in real risk.
5. A Research Agenda
Our economic model is only one potential interpretation of the implications of the joint
dynamics of interest rates and risk for monetary policy analysis. In looking forward more
broadly to a new research agenda for monetary policy analysis, we take away two important
questions to be confronted in future research.
241. One question regards the secular movements in the Fed’s policy instrument. We inter-
pret these as arising from random walk movements in the Fed’s inﬂation target. We
view this interpretation as a purely mechanical accounting of these secular movements.
It avoids a central question: Why did the Fed choose the secular movements in its
policy instrument?
2. The other question regards the business cycle comovements between the Fed’s policy
instrument and the macroeconomy as captured in the standard Euler equation. We have
suggested here–and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) have documented–that, in
practice, standard monetary models miss this link. Now we need to know, How do we
ﬁx our models so that they capture it?
A .W h yD i dt h eF e dC h o o s et h eS e c u l a rM o v e m e n t si nP o l i c y ?
The literature has oﬀered two basic approaches to modeling the secular movements
in the short rate in postwar U.S. data. One approach mechanically describes aspects of Fed
policy over this period that led to these movements. The other approach explicitly models
the Fed’s objectives and information that led to its behavior. Neither approach has so far
been successful.
I no u re c o n o m i cm o d e l ,w eh a v ef o l l o w e dt h eﬁrst approach that mechanically describes
the secular movements in Fed policy as arising from a random walk inﬂation target. We have
documented that the random walk policy component is large, accounting for over 90% of the
variance in the short rate over the postwar period. This model seems adequate as a purely
statistical description of Fed policy, but seems useless for answering fundamental questions
at any more than a superﬁcial level. Again, Why did the great inﬂation of the 1970s occur?
Why did it end? Is it likely to occur again? How can we change institutions to reduce that
likelihood?
Researchers have begun wrestling with these questions. For example, Orphanides
(2002) argues that the Fed’s diﬃculties in interpreting real time economic data in the 1970s
played a key role in shaping the Fed’s choice of the short rate during that time. It is unclear,
however, what mechanism in this framework would lead to a large random walk component
in policy. Thus, we do not see how an explanation of this sort would be able to account for
25secular component of Fed policy.
Primiceri (2006) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006) have made the most ambitious
attempts to reconcile the observed secular movements in Fed policy with optimizing behavior
by the Fed. In their work, the Fed uses a misspeciﬁed model to choose policy and continually
revises that model in light of the data. This approach is clearly aimed at fundamental
questions in analysis of monetary policy in the postwar period. Unfortunately, data on the
secular movements in Fed policy pose a formidable challenge to models of this type. The
basic problem is that these models have a very diﬃcult time generating a volatile random
walk component of policy simply from learning dynamics.
To illustrate this point we graph in Figure 5 the time series for long run averages of
expected inﬂation over horizons of 20 and 30 years from the model of Sargent, Williams, and
Zha (2005) together with the secular component of Fed policy from our quantitative model.6
Clearly, the expectations of long-run averages of inﬂation from the learning model are much
less volatile than the secular component of postwar monetary policy.
In sum, existing approaches to the forces driving the secular component of policy have
not been successful. Thus a new approach is needed.
In thinking about a new approach, we note that the secular component of interest
rates has not always been so volatile. In fact, the postwar period stands out from the U.S.
historical record as a period with exceptionally high volatility of the secular component of
interest rates. To illustrate this point, in Figure 6A we graph a short rate and a long rate for
the United States from 1836 through 2007. For the short rate we use the U.S. three-month
commercial paper rate and for the long rate, we use the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury
bond (available at www.globalﬁnancialdata.com.). Clearly, in the prewar period, ﬂuctuations
in the long rate (which we associate with the secular component of interest rates) are a much
smaller fraction of overall ﬂuctuations in the short rate than they are in the postwar period.
This diﬀerence in pre- and post-war behavior of long and short rates is also evident
in the data for many other countries, including the United Kingdom (Figure 6B), France
(Figure 6C), Germany (Figure 6D), and the Netherlands (Figure 6E).
6Tao Zha kindly provided us with these long run expectations of inﬂation from the 2006 Sargent, Williams,
and Zha model.
26A central question in the analysis of monetary policy at the secular level then is What
institutional changes led to this pattern? To answer this question at a mechanical level,
we note that the Gold Standard was the main institution governing monetary policy in the
prewar era and that after the war most countries switched to a ﬁat standard governed for
part of the time by the Bretton Woods agreement. But this answer is, at best, superﬁcial.
I nt h ep r e w a re r a ,c o u n t r i e sc h o s et ob eo nt h eG o l dS t a n d a r dm o s to ft h et i m ea n dc h o s et o
leave it when it suited their purposes. Thus, the relevant questions are, rather, What deeper
forces led agents to have conﬁdence that their governments would choose stable policy over
the long term? And what forces led them to lose this conﬁdence after World War II. Only
if we can quantitatively account for this history can we give advice on how to avoid another
great inﬂation.
B. How Do We Fix the Euler Equation in Our Models?
As we have discussed in modern monetary models, the policy instrument enters the
economy through the Euler equation that links the short rate to expectations of growth
in the marginal utility of consumption and inﬂation. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)
document that this Euler equation in standard models does a miserable job of capturing
this link between policy and the economy at business cycle frequencies. Here we oﬀer some
intuition for why this is so here. We then argue that existing attempts to ﬁxt h i sE u l e r
equation are misguided and we propose a new direction.
Consider, ﬁrst, what aspects of the comovements of the short rate and macroeconomic
aggregates that are not captured by in the Euler equation of standard monetary models. The





are too smooth relative to the short rate at business cycle frequencies so they account for
virtually none of the ﬂuctuations in the policy variable, the short rate, at these frequencies.
To illustrate this point, we7 have estimated a version of the Smets and Wouters (2007)
7Actually, we asked Ellen McGrattan to reestimate the model using codes kindly provided by Frank Smets
and Raf Wouters and she kindly obliged. This applies later to the computations underlying Figures 10 and
11 as well.
27model, with their habit preferences replaced by standard CRRA preferences, and computed
the errors in the consumption Euler equation, where the error is computed as








In Figure 7, we plot the HP-ﬁltered short rate (the Fed Funds Rate) and the HP
ﬁltered error in the Euler equation. (We HP-ﬁlter both it and errort so that we can focus
on business cycle frequencies.) We ﬁnd this ﬁgure striking. As we have explained, in theory
the standard monetary models imply that movements in the short rate are associated one-
for-one with the sum of the movements in the expected growth of the log of marginal utility
for the representative consumer and expected inﬂation. Figure 7 shows that, in practice, in
a standard monetary model, movements in the short rate are associated almost one-for-one
with Euler equation error and the model captures essentially none of the link between the
short rate and the macroeconomy. Since this Euler equation is the fundamental link between
monetary policy and the macroeconomy, this type of model can hardly be said to be useful
in accounting for analyzing monetary policy at business cycle frequencies if the observed
movements in the monetary policy instrument at these frequencies correspond simply to the
unexplained error in this equation.
How should we ﬁx this problem? To address this question, consider the Euler equation
allowing for movements in conditional variances:
it = −Et log
Uct+1
Uct












Consider, ﬁrst, a way that has been tried to ﬁx this equation but doesn’t work. The approach
taken in most of the literature so far has been to use more exotic preferences, such as prefer-
ences with habit persistence, but to continue to log-linearize the model and assume constant
conditional variances. Mechanically, this approach amounts to making the conditional means
of marginal utility growth (Et logUct+1/Uct) more volatile while assuming that the conditional
variances are still constant.
That this approach is a failure is well-documented by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2007). For example, consider what happens when we repeat the experiment Figure 7 using
the Smets-Wouters model as speciﬁed with habit persistence. In Figure 8, we plot the HP-
28ﬁltered short rate and the HP-ﬁltered Euler equation error from the model. Clearly adding
habit is not improving matters.
Our decomposition suggests the approach being taken in the literature to ﬁxing the
Euler equation is misguided. Our decomposition indicates that we should not be trying to
make the conditional mean more volatile at business cycle frequencies; at these frequencies,
it is approximately constant. Instead, we should be looking for a framework that delivers
smooth conditional means and volatile conditional variances of the pricing kernel at business
cycle frequencies.
Note that the economic model we have described here, while useful in helping us
interpret the data, is probably not the full answer to this problem. In that model, we
have made special assumptions which guarantee that the conditional mean of the pricing
kernel is constant. (We made consumption growth i.i.d. and engineered the habit process
appropriately.) If Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) are right that expected consumption
growth varies over time, then our model is likely to have problems similar to those they
document for other models. The reason is that when expected consumption growth varies
over time, the conditional mean of the pricing kernel in our model would likely to become
volatile.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have used a simple model of the pricing kernel to interpret the postwar U.S. data
on the dynamics of interest rates and risk and to draw out implications from these data for
new research directions for monetary policy analysis.
Our work here also points to new directions for empirical work on the dynamics of
interest rates and risk. We have used a simple model of the pricing kernel and have shown
that, given the data, it yields a very sharp characterization of the dynamics of the short rate,
the conditional mean of the pricing kernel, and its conditional variance. The short rate has a
random walk component that accounts for the vast bulk of its movements. The conditional
mean of the pricing kernel closely tracks that random walk component. The short rate also
has stationary component which accounts for almost all of the rest of its movements. The
conditional variance of the pricing kernel closely tracks this stationary component.
29We think that reﬁning our simple characterization empirically might yield some useful
results. Speciﬁcally, a huge literature uses a wide variety of aﬃne models of the pricing kernel
to model the dynamics of interest rates and risk. Prominent recent examples are Dai and
Singleton (2002) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008). The most promising of these models
might be used to develop new tools for using yield curve data in real time to help guide the
Fed’s choice of monetary policy.
In building our economic model, we made assumptions that gave one possible inter-
pretation to the joint dynamics of interest rate and risk that we uncovered with our pricing
kernel. Under this interpretation the Fed must continually adjust the short-term nominal
interest rate in response to exogenous time variation in risk even if the Fed’s sole objective
is to maintain a constant level of expected inﬂation. We think of this view as the exogenous
risk approach. An alternative approach, the endogenous risk approach, reverses the direc-
tion of causality. In it, the Fed is an active player in generating time-varying risk. Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002, 2007) propose such an approach. At this point we do not see any
strong evidence favoring one approach over the other. Clearly, before progress can be made
in modeling monetary policy, we must sort out which way the causality actually runs: from
risk to the Fed or from the Fed to risk.
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* The short rate is the 3-month T-bill rate. The secular and business cycle components are the first two principal components derived from a 
decomposition of the covariance matrix of a vector of 14 yields: the 3-month rate and the imputed zero coupon yields for maturities k=1,...,13 years 
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long rate
* The long rate is the imputed zero coupon yield for 13-year bonds over 1946:12–2007:12. 
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* The yield spread y
L
t-it is defined as the difference between the imputed zero coupon yield for 13-year bonds and the 3-month T- bill rate. For the 
business cycle component, see note to Figure 1.
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component
yield spreadFigure 4: Loadings on the secular and business cycle components 
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* The loadings on the secular and business cycle components in the data are the factor loadings in the principal components decomposition. The 
loadings are the secular components in the model and the coefficients Bk/k and Ck/k, respectively.Figure 5: Sargent-Williams-Zha (SWZ) expectations of 20- and 30-year average inflation 
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* The short rate is the 3-month commercial paper rate, and the long rate is the yield of a long-term bond. For detailed information see the data 
appendix.
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* The short rate is the private discount rate, and the long rate is the 2.5% consol yield. For detailed information, see the data appendix.
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* The short rate is the private discount rate for the period 1860–1914 and the 3-month T-bill for 1960–2007. The long rate is the 10-year 
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* The short rate is the Berlin discount rate for the period 1860–1914 and the 3-month T-bill for 1953–2007. The long rate is the 10-year government 
bond yield. For detailed information, see the data appendix.
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* The short rate is the private discount rate  for the period 1860–1914 and the 3-month T-bill for 1946–2007. The long rate is the 10-year 
government bond yield. For detailed information, see the data appendix.
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